Economic distortions created by the dairy farming support system in Iceland are examined in this paper. Specifically, the impact of the direct payments component of this system is analyzed. The analysis lead to the conclusion that the form of direct payments that has been used is in many ways well-suited to improve dairy farmers' living standards without creating additional social costs in terms of resource misallocation. It follows that it would be socially wasteful, as well as economically detrimental to dairy farmers, to replace this system with an economically less efficient way of providing them with the same amount of financial support.
The essentials of the system in 1992-2016
In addition to import restrictions and tariffs, 6 the dairy support system consists of the following three main components:
1. A minimum price per litre of milk supplied to and payable by dairies. This price is set by the Agricultural Pricing Committee ("Verðlagsnefnd búvara").
2. Supplementary direct payments ("beingreiðslur") from the state to farmers for milk delivered to dairies up to a predetermined total volume ("heildargreiðslumark").
The key elements of this system are:
o The Government (Parliament) decides on the amount of total direct payments for each calendar year. In what follows, we refer to this amount as S. 7 o The Government (Ministry of Agriculture), having received proposals by the association of dairy processors and the association of dairy farmers (Landssamband kúabaenda), decides on the total volume of milk production entitled to direct payments ("heildargreiðslumark") per calendar year. We refer to this volume as the total direct payment quota and denote it by Q.
o The potential direct payment to farmers per litre of milk delivered to dairies and entitled to direct payments is thus defined as s=S/Q.
o The actual payment received by individual farmers depends on their level of production according to a fairly complicated payment formula. 8 o The total direct payment quota, Q, is shared amongst individual dairy farms with farm i holding the fraction a(i).
o Once the total direct payment quota has been set, the individual direct payment quotas are determined as ( ) ( ) . q i a i Q = ⋅ 9
o The direct payment quota shares, a(i)s are transferable with some restrictions. 3. Various other supports such as payments per head of cattle, supports for breeding programs (genetic improvements), land improvement supports, supports for construction and improvement of stables and other facilities.
Of these categories of support, only the second and third represent outlays by the government; the first is paid for by consumers in the form of a higher price for milk 6 For a short summary on the import tariffs and other import restrictions, see the Institute of Economics Studies report on the dairy industry (Hagfraeðistofnun 2015) . 7 Prior to the government decision, negotiations between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Farmers' Associations take place (see also footnote 5 above). The game-theoretic aspects of these negotiations are interesting but irrelevant for and outside the scope of this paper. According to the regulations for the 2016 calendar year (no. 1220/2015) , the direct payment to any given dairy farmer is divided into three categories, A, B and C. Payment A amounting to 40% of the payment per litre (i.e. s) becomes fully payable if the farmer produces 80% or more of his individual quota during the year. For less production, the A payment is proportional to the level of production. Payment B amounting to 35% of s depends directly on the level of production. Payment C, amounting to 25% of s is only paid in full for the volume the farmer produces at least 1/12 of his annual quota during each of the last 7 months of the year. The direct payment schedule is explained and considered in further detail in the Appendix. products than would otherwise be the case. In 2016, the government expenditures on support categories 2 and 3 were 6.6 billion kr. of which direct payments amounted to about 5.5 billion kr. or 83% (Ríkisreikningur, 2016) .
It should be noted that the minimum price payable by dairies is sustained by tariffs, import restrictions and strict quality controls on the importation of dairy products including the main ones (fresh milk, cream and butter). Without these import barriers, it would not be possible for the dairy processors to pay the minimum price for the milk supplied to them by farmers. Thus, the import restrictions are an integral part of the overall dairy support system. Without it the minimum price regime would likely collapse.
It is important to realize that the dairy support system in effect does not impose a restriction on the volume produced by individual farmers. They are allowed to produce as much as they want. 10 However, they will not receive direct payments for production in excess of their direct payment quota and while the dairies have in practice often paid the minimum price for milk supplied in excess of the direct payment quota, they are not required to do so. Table 1 summarizes key quantitative information about the operation of the direct payments system from 2005 onward. The second column of the table shows the total volume of milk production entitled to direct payments, i.e. the direct payment quota, Q. 11 Apparently, the direct payment quota is supposed to reflect expected total domestic consumption of milk products and, therefore, is determined by previous consumption as well as estimated change in consumption (Act no. 99/1993, article 52). Hence the increasing trend over time.
Quantitative description of the 1992-2016 system
The third column in table 1 shows the total amount of direct payments, S, evaluated at the 2016 price level. Note that this amount (total direct payments) declined substantially in real terms since 2005 or by some 23%.
The fourth column in table 1, obtained as the ratio of the third to the second columns, shows the direct payments per litre of production. As is readily seen, the direct payments per litre have fallen drastically in real terms since 2005 or by almost 2/5.
The fifth column in table 1 shows the minimum price payable by dairies to farmers for a litre of first-rate milk produced within the individual direct payment quota. As already stated, this minimum price is determined each year by the Agricultural Pricing Committee ("Verðlagsnefnd búvara"). 12 As can be seen in table 1, the minimum price, measured in 2016 real terms, increased considerably until 2008 but has been relatively constant since then. A farmer's total revenue per litre of milk produced is the sum of the direct payment per litre and the minimum price. This is shown in the last column in table 1. It shows that the total revenue (calculated price) per litre has declined since 2005 by almost 12%. 13 2.3 Direct payment quotas and milk production As pointed out above, the individual direct payment quota is not a production quota. It does not constrain the farmer to produce only the volume that the payment quota stipulates. Rather, the payment quota simply defines a right to a government subsidy per litre of production up to the quota limit (further details on the subsidy price per litre are in the Appenix). In fact, every year dairy farmers have produced milk considerably in excess of the direct payment quota (see table 2). 14   12 This minimum price is supposed to ensure that dairy farmers' income is similar to that of comparable professions. As such it incorporates information on production costs (Act No. 99/1993, Article 8) as well as the expected direct payments. 13 The total amount of the direct payments has declined, in real terms (2016 price level), by 25%, and total government payments to the dairy sector has declined, in real terms, by 11% in this same period, 2003-2016. 14 Milk production has been in excess of the total payment quota volume every year since the late 1990s. Milk production in excess of direct payment quota, referred to as excess milk ("umframmjólk"), may be sold to dairies but it is not subject to the minimum price stipulated by the Agricultural Pricing Committee. 15 The dairies are free to pay a different price for the excess milk and the farmer does not receive any direct payments for excess milk (but see Appendix further on this). The price that dairies have paid for excess milk has been highly dependent on the domestic demand for milk products relative to the production. In years of high demand relative to production, the dairies have proved willing to pay at least the minimum price. When domestic demand has been low relative to production and the dairies have been forced to produce low priced products such as milk powder for export, they have offered considerably lower price for the excess milk (Institute of Economic Studies, 2015) . 16 15 This committee not only sets the minimum price (for various grades of milk) that dairies have to pay farmers for their milk. The dairy production sector is bound by price controls on all standard products, such as whole milk, skimmed milk, cream, plain butter, hard cheese, plain skyr, and milk powder. The committe therefore sets the maximum (ceiling) wholesale level prices for these products (it in effect attempts to calculate a proper margin that the dairies need to recover production costs on top of the minimum prices paid to milk farmers). Other non-standard dairy products, such as varieties of cheeses, buttermilk, yogurt, etc. are not subject to price controls. Also, there is freedom of pricing at the retail level. The Institute of Economic Studies (2014:46-47) report shows that wholesale prices for those dairy products subject to price ceilings have declined in real terms (price level 2013) by 1%-18% in 2003-2013 ; cream price declined most and skimmed-milk powder the least. They also show that retail prices for these products have increased less than the general consumer price index in the same period. This suggests that slowly decreasing government support to the dairy industry is increasing consumer surplus. 16 This market price for excess milk was about 50-70% of the minimum price in 2008-2013, but in 2013- 2016 it increased to 100%. It was approximately 75% of the minimum price from July 2016. For information on price of unprocessed milk, see Audhumla.is. Sources: Regulations on "greiðslumark mjólkur á lögbýlum og greiðslur til baenda", Auðhumla, SAM ("Samband afurðastöðva í mjólkuriðnaði") yearly reports. Table 2 shows the volume and percentage of excess milk produced by dairy farmers from 2005. The table shows that in spite of the marginal revenue for excess milk being substantially lower than marginal revenue for milk produced within the direct payment quota, farmers have elected to produce a significant amount of excess milk every year. On average since 2005, the volume of excess milk produced has been 6.6% of the direct payment quotas. Most of the years, the excess milk production has been above 5%. 17 In only one year, 2005, has it been below 2%. 18 Farmers, of course, produce excess milk because they deem it profitable. In the short run, the marginal cost of producing milk may be low because the necessary investment in cows and facilities is already there. However, a persistent and substantial production of excess milk is strong evidence that at least some farmers and therefore the industry as a whole can produce milk at a (marginal) cost below the minimum price.
Transferability of direct payment quotas
The direct payment quotas held by individual farmers are transferable (Act No. 99/1993) . 19 During the early years of the direct payments system (in the 1990s), these transfers were for the most part unrestricted. However, subsequently, it was apparently felt necessary to impose restrictions on how these trades could proceed. According to regulations in 2010-2016, transfers of direct payment quotas took place under the auspices of MAST (the Icelandic Food and Veterinary Authority). MAST invited written bids and offers that were opened on specific market days (three times a year). On the basis of the bids and offers MAST worked out supply and demand schedules and calculated the so-called equilibrium price ("jafnvaegisverð"). All lower bids and higher offers were then rejected and the remaining bids and offers became binding contracts.
From 2011 the annual volume of trades was generally between one and two million litres or above 1% of the total volume of outstanding direct payment quotas ( Figure 1 ). This suggests considerable rearrangement of the milk production between farms under the direct payment system, a finding consistent with the reduction in the number of active dairy farms (see section 2.5 below). As shown in figure 1, there was a severe drop in market activity and trades between 2014 and 2015. The reasons for this trough, while interesting, are outside the scope of this study. However, there are indications that uncertainty about the future of the direct payments system in connection with the general review of the overall dairly farming support system which got underway in 2014 may have played a major role in this. This hypothesis is lent certain quantitative support by the fact that the supply (offers to sell) of direct payment quotas during the first market period in 2014 was very high while the demand (bids to buy) was almost nonexistent. 21 The direct payment quota market recovered in 2015 and especially 2016, apparently partly because of less uncertainty about the future of the system. 22 In addition, it should be noted that market activity in the September and November 2016 may have been distorted upward by the transferred between farms) were on average 4.7% of total volume of production each year and additionally another 4% were transferred on average each year through ownership changes of farms. Of these ownership changes, about a third were between unrelated parties while over 60% were based on next generation assuming ownership or incorporating the farm business. Based on this information, in addition to that mentioned above, we could infer that no less than 4% of quotas have changed ownership on average each year in 1992-2016. But, of course, some of this quota has been traded more than once in the period, so we should not assume that all or nearly all the quota has changed hands, although the number of dairy farms has decreased in this period from 1456 to 596, or by almost 3/5. 21 The large increase in the volume of quota in 2013-2015, some 20% increase, may also have affected the lower trade in quotas, as well as the decision by dairies to pay full minimum price for excess milk from October 2013. 22 Expectations formed on news from the discussions between the farmers association and the government that the quota system would be retained in some form at least to 2020. previous announcement of a provisional halt to direct payment quota trading from 2017 onward. From 2010 to 2014, the equilibrium price for direct payment quotas was fairly constant at close to 300 kr./litre (at current price levels). However, it dropped considerably in 2014 and was around 200 to 250 kr./litre in 2015 and 2016. It may be noted that these direct payment quota prices (of five to seven times the direct payments) suggest either inordinately high discount rates of between 14 and 20% or the expectation that the system of direct payments will end in the near future (next 4 to 8 years) or both.
Increased productivity
There is considerable evidence of increased productivity in dairy production under the direct payments system at least since 2005. 23 First, the number of farms has fallen and the average production per farm has increased substantially (see figure 2) .
This suggests that technically available returns to scale in dairy production at the farm level are being exploited to a greater extent than before. Second, the total real price per unit of milk production received by the farmers (see table 1 and figure 3) has declined considerably since 2005 while at the same time, dairy farmers' net income has, if anything, improved. This also suggests improvement in productivity.
This suggests that technically available returns to scale in dairy production at the farm level are being exploited to a greater extent than before. Second, the total real price per unit of milk production received by the farmers (see table 1 and figure 3) has declined considerably since 2005 while at the same time, dairy farmers' net income has, if anything, improved. This also suggests improvement in productivity. 23 Actually, available production statistics (Auðhumla og ársskýrslur SAM) indicate a considerable growth in production per farm since 1978. This growth, however, became much more rapid from 1993 onwards as the system of direct payment was adopted. Number of dairy farms Number of dairy farms Average production
Milk thousand litres
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As explained above, the total price received by dairy farmers for their production consists of the minimum price paid to them by the dairies and the direct payments received from the state. The evolution of these prices in real terms (2016 price level), is illustrated in figure 3 . As is evident from the figure, the total price has declined considerably or by 12% since 2005. Since, apparently, dairy farmers' net income has not declined during this period, this decline in the real price is indicative of at least the commensurate annual growth in total factor productivity of dairy farming since 2005.
Interestingly, the fall in the real price received by dairy farmers is explained solely by the fall in the real value of the direct payments per litre of production. These payments have fallen by almost 2/5 since 2005 (for details see table 1), while the real value of the minimum price has actually increased slightly.
Analysis
In this section we attempt to explain the impact of two of the main strands of the milk production support system, namely the minimum price and the direct payments, on the level of milk production and economic efficiency. In accordance with standard economic practice, we assume that all prices, except the price of unprocessed milk, are true, i.e. accurately measure marginal social benefits and costs.
We further take it for granted that there exists a domestic demand function for unprocessed milk with the usual properties (positive for some positive price, continuous, and downward sloping). We write the inverse of this function as: where q is the quantity of unprocessed milk. The vector z represents other variables that may affect the demand and Dq denotes the first derivative of the demand function (where it exits) with respect to the quantity of milk. Needless to say, this demand function is derived from the final demand for milk products. In this paper, however, the downstream stages of the value chain for milk products are not of concern. 24 Similarly, we take it that there exists an import supply function for unprocessed milk. For our purposes it is most convenient to define this supply as the same quality unprocessed milk delivered at the same locations and in the same containers as domestic milk. Therefore, although this supply price, pw, may be taken to be closely related to the world supply price of unprocessed milk, it would generally be somewhat higher. We write this supply price as:
Relative to the possible size of the Icelandic demand, it is safe to assume that the slope of this function is zero, i.e. the import supply is infinitely elastic implying a constant supply price pw. Importantly, this import price represents the price at which Icelandic society can obtain unprocessed milk from abroad. It thus reflects the true (or shadow) price of unprocessed milk in Iceland.
The domestic supply of unprocessed milk comes from several hundred dairy farmers. Let the number of these farmers be I. Their individual production costs may presumably be represented by the increasing cost functions:
where q(i) is the supply of farmer i, and x a vector of other variables affecting production costs including technology, farm attributes and so on. In what follows, for notational simplicity, reference to the vector x will generally be suppressed. For convenience we assume that these cost functions are twice continuously differentiable. Assuming, quite reasonably, that all of these dairy farmers are price takers, it is wellknown that their individual supply functions are the upward sloping part of their marginal cost functions (see e.g. Varian 1984) . 25 In other words:
where the first derivative of the cost function, Cq(i), denotes the marginal costs. 24 In fact the demand curve (function) does not play a role or affect our analysis below. It is only to illustrate the traditionl approach to explaining the welfare losses from restrictions on trade and price formation that we use it here in this section of the paper. In section 3,1 and after, the minimum price + support price are the relevant demand. But the supply curve (function) has a role and affects the analysis. 25 Production ranges over which the cost function is nonconvex (e.g. increasing returns to scale) are irrelevant here because price takers never find it optimal to produce there (see e.g. Varian 1984 ).
The aggregate (total) domestic supply of unprocessed milk is simply the horizontal sum of the (upward sloping part) of the individual marginal cost functions (Hicks 1946 , see also Varian 1984) : 
This must be positively sloping because the individual marginal cost functions are. 26 It seems helpful to illustrate the system defined by equations (1), (2) and (4) by the usual quantity-price diagram for the milk market. This is done in figure 4 . In this figure, the domestic demand is labelled D(q), domestic supply S(q) and the import supply function by the import price, pw. 26 It is useful to note, however, that because of the horizontal summation the aggregate supply function is generally flatter and usually much flatter than the individual supply functions. 
| Tímarit um viðskipti og efnahagsmál
Now, there are indications that a part of the domestic milk production can be supplied at cost at or below the import price, pw. 27 Consequently the domestic supply curve is drawn accordingly. It should be mentioned, however, that, for the analysis of this paper, it is of no consequence whether domestic industry can actually supply a positive quantity at or below the import price.
As the functions in figure 4 are drawn, under free trade, market equilibrium would be at the import price, pw, and quantity q** of which the domestic supply would be q*. Total social benefits of this market equilibrium would be approximately the consumer surplus measured by the integral underneath the demand function, − , * * plus the producer surplus indicated by the area A in the diagram (Varian 1984) . 28 Note that if the domestic supply price always exceeds the world import price, the socially optimal domestic production, q*, would be zero and therefore also the producer surplus A.
At this point it is crucial to realize that any domestic production of milk in excess of q* is economically inefficient. The reason is that the cost of producing more than q* is higher than the price for which the product is available from abroad. This means that the domestic economic resources used to produce above q* would be better used in other activities. Moreover, the degree of inefficiency increases with the level of production beyond q*. We state this formally as result 1
Result 1
Any domestic production above q* is economically inefficient. The degree of inefficiency increases with the distance from q*.
For later use it is convenient to define the social loss of producing milk in excess of q*. From a social perspective, the producer surplus of any production, q, is
This benefit function has a maximum at the socially optimal production level q*. At q* the producer surplus is B(q*) which equals the area A in figure 4. Thus the social loss of producing q is simply:
It is easy to see that this social loss function has a minimum of zero at q=q*, is positive for any other levels of production and at least weakly convex. An example of its shape is illustrated in figure 5 . 27 For instance some Icelandic dairy farms employing the state-of-the-art technology (robotic milking in a free-stall cow houses) and, producing close to million litres per year, are close to the efficient European diary farm size. Since farming land is inexpensive in Iceland, there seems no reason to believe that production costs in these farms are significantly higher than abroad. 28 For a useful discussion about the accuracy of the consumer surplus measures, see Willig (1976) .
To induce domestic producers to produce above q* it is necessary to offer them a price above the import price, pw. This will lead to a social loss in production approximately measured by the social loss function (8). If, in addition, consumers are asked to pay the higher price, there will be a loss in consumer surplus as well. As an example, imagine in figure 4 that import of unprocessed milk is not allowed. In that case, all milk would be domestically produced and the market equilibrium would occur at (q°°, p°°). At this point there would be a total social loss amounting to the area C+D. The total social loss would not be equally distributed. Producers of milk who enjoy the higher price, p°°, would gain B while the demanders of unprocessed milk, who have to pay the higher price, p°°, would lose B+C+D. 29 3.1 The milk production support system As described in section 2, there is an extensive support system for primary milk production in Iceland. Most importantly, there are substantial barriers (import restrictions, tariffs and quality controls) on the import of unprocessed milk and several final milk products. In addition to this, domestic producers are supported primarily in three ways:
1. Minimum price for unprocessed milk supplied to dairies.
2. Direct payments from the state for production up to a certain volume ("heildargreiðslumark").
Various other supports.
Here we only consider the first two. The third consists of a number of production and investment supports (see section 2.1) which together amount to a small fraction of the other 29 Although the restriction of international trade in milk and related products is not the topic of analysis here, it may be of interest to the reader that in Hagfraeðistofnun (2015) the production inefficiency resulting from trade restriction in Iceland is estimated to be of the size of 0.5-3.0 billion kr. pr. year. two. 30 The minimum price is easily modelled as simply pmin which to be effective must be higher than the import price, pw.
The direct payment from the state to holders of direct payment quotas is a bit more involved. The direct payment per litre of unprocessed milk subject to direct payments may be defined as: 31 = !
Where S is the total amount allocated to direct payments and Q is the direct payment quota, i.e. the total volume of milk entitled to direct payments. As explained in section 2, the total direct payment is determined annually by the state budget. The direct payment quota, however, is determined subsequently by regulations issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, as mentioned above.
Let us now try to incorporate these two main components of the dairy support system into the basic unprocessed milk market situation illustrated in figure 4 . This is attempted in figure 6 .
Under the dairy support system, the price per litre of production received by the dairy farmers (their effective demand function) is the minimum price plus the direct payments from the state.
The minimum price, pmin, is drawn as a horizontal line in figure 6 . Dairy processors may of course offer a higher price than pmin or a lower minum price for quantity above the direct payment quota, indicated by Q' in figure 6. If so, the minimum price will not be a horizontal line. This, however, as is easy to verify, will not materially affect the ensuing analysis.
The direct payments depend on the total funds allocated to direct payments, S, and the total direct payment quota, Q, as defined in equation (9). These direct payments (added to the minimum price) are drawn as the dashed curve in figure 6 . The curve is dashed because it illustrates the total price to holders of direct payment quotas for various levels of total direct payment quota, Q. Only when Q has been selected will the amount of direct payments per litre of milk be determined.
Let us now assume that the total direct payment quota has been set at Q' in figure 6 resulting in direct payments per litre of s=S/Q'. In that case, dairy farmers will receive a price per litre of milk amounting to s+pmin for production up to volume Q'. For production above Q', however, dairy farmers only receive the minimum price, pmin. Thus, in effect, dairy farmers are faced with a one-step demand function indicated by the bold price lines in figure 6 . The price is constant at s+pmin up to production volume Q'. At Q' there is a discontinuous fall in the price to pmin. 32 30 In 2016, these other supports amounted to only about 17% of the total state supports (Ríkisreikningur 2016). The state supports, however, do not include the minimum price supports which consumers pay. 31 To actually receive the full direct payments per litre produced, farmers have to meet certain other payment conditions (see the Appendix). 32 Due to the direct payment conditions (see the Appendix) the actual direct payments for production below Q' may possibly deviate from s. This, however, does not materially affect the anlysis; only the shape of the s+pmin schedule below Q' is affected. Moreover, this part of the price schedule is not
As the direct payment quota is set in the figure 6, i.e. at Q', dairy farmers find it profitable to produce in excess of this quota, more precisely at q'. This is, as explained in section 2.3 above, in accordance with what has actually been the case under the direct payment system, as mentioned above. Now, the production level q' is higher than the socially optimal production q*. Therefore, as established by the social loss function, L(q,q*), q' represents excessive production. More precisely, at q', there is a loss in social surplus approximately equal to the shaded area B in figure 6 .
From the perspective of this paper, however, the crucial point is that the inefficiency of producing at q' is entirely caused by the minimum price. The direct payments have nothing to do with it. It is easily seen from the diagram in figure 6 that dairy farmers would produce exactly the same volume of milk, i.e. q', even if there were no direct payments. In other words, the direct payments are in this case pure transfers. They do not affect the quantity of milk produced. All the production inefficiency of the dairy support system is solely generated by the minimum price This finding, however, does not apply generally. It is entirely dependent upon the direct payment quota, Q, not being set too high. Thus, it is easy to see from figure 6 that if the direct payment quota is increased from Q' (for a fixed amount of direct payments, S), the level of production will ultimately start to rise. More precisely, this will happen when the direct payment quota, Q, exceeds q'.
empirically relevant as the industry has consistently produced in excess of Q' (see section 2.3). Moreover, as will be explained below a sensible operation of the direct payments system requires that to be the case. Now, q' is the milk production dairy farmers would choose as a result of the minimum price but without any direct payments. This suggests the following result:
Result 2
The system of direct payments to dairy farmers will not lead to added production inefficiency compared to the system of minimum price provided the direct payment quota, Q, is not set above the level the farmers would select with only the minimum price and no direct payments.
So, it appears that if the authorities managing the dairy support system avoid setting the direct payment quota above the level, farmers would otherwise select, the system of direct payments will not generate production inefficiency in addition to that already created by the minimum price.
The relationship between the direct payment quota and production inefficiency
The above has established that whether the system of direct payments leads to increased milk production and, therefore, added production inefficiency depends on the size of the direct payment quota, Q. It therefore appears useful to investigate the relationship between the direct payment quota and the level of production further. To this we now turn:
Let us assume that the amount of direct payments, S, has already been decided. Let q° denote the profit maximizing production by dairy farmers. Then, the decision on the direct payment quota can lead to three distinct situations or phases:
Q>q°.
It is important to realize that phase II applies to not merely one value of Q but to a range defined by the interval [Qlower,Qupper] . To see that this interval is of positive length it is sufficient to imagine Q' in figure 6 increasing to q' (which equals Qlower) and from there to q'' (which equals Qupper ).
Phase I. Q<q°
In this phase, the effective demand price to producers is pmin. So the farmers' profit maximizing production level is simply determined by S(q°)=pmin. So, the profit maximizing production level, q°, is independent of Q as asserted in result 2.
As already stated, this phase ends when the direct payment quota has reached q° defined above as Qlower. It may be helpful to recall that in figure 6, q'=Qlower≡ q°.
Phase II. Q=q°
In this phase, the profit maximizing production level is simply q°=Q. So the production level, and, therefore, the production inefficiency increases proportionately with the total direct payment quota, Q, reaching a maximum at Qupper defined by S(q°)=pmin+S/Qupper.
Phase III. Q>q°
In this phase, the direct payment quota exceeds the actual milk production. The marginal revenues to milk producers, therefore, are given by min p S Q + , where S/Q, as before, is the payment per litre. 33 The quantity produced, therefore, is defined by ( ) min S q p S Q°= + . From this it is easy to see that the farmers' profit maximizing production level, q° falls with the level of the direct payment quota, Q. 34 Moreover, while starting at the maximum defined by S(q°)=pmin+S/Qupper, it converges asymptotically to S(q°)=pmin as the direct payment quota goes to infinity.
The overall relationship between the total direct payment quota and the actual production is summarized in figure 7 . As illustrated in the figure, for any level of direct supports, S, provided the total direct payment quota, Q, is set below Qlower, the direct payments have no effect on the volume of milk production. The production remains as if there were no direct payments.
However, when the direct payment quota exceeds, Qlower, phase II is entered and milk production starts to increase proportionately with the direct payment quota reaching a maximum at Qupper defined by Increasing the direct payment quota further leads to less production because the direct payments per litre fall with direct payment quota according to s=S/Q leading to less and less production ultimately converging to Qlower when Q approaches infinity and the direct payment per litre, s, converges to zero.
Thus, somewhat curiously, the system of direct payments to dairy farmer has no distortionary impact on milk production when the direct payment quota is less than Qlower or, alternatively, infinitely high.
3.3 Non-distortion of the direct payment system: The general result According to Result 2, the system of direct payments does not increase the production of milk provided the direct payment quota, Q, is not set above the production level the farmers would choose with only the minimum price support and no direct payments. Clearly, the minimum price system does not play any particular role in this context. What is of importance is the production level without the direct payments, irrespective of how this is brought about. This suggests the following generalization of Result 2.
Result 3
The system of direct payments to dairy farmers will not lead to added production inefficiency provided the direct payment quota, Q, is not set above what the farmers would otherwise produce.
It is interesting to note that this result does not depend on the amount of direct payments, S. This can be as high or low as the authorities want. The authorities only have to be careful not to set the direct payment quota too high. Thus, the system of direct payments offers an effective way to bring social supports to farmers (and other producers) without affecting their production.
In the dairy farming support system discussed in this paper, there are two potential distortions; the minimum price and the direct payments. Both encourage production. However, they interact in an interesting way. First the minimum price encourages production to a level above the socially optimal one, namely q' compared to q* in figure 6. Second the direct payments encourage production but only up to the level of the direct payment quota. Beyond the direct payment quota, there are no direct payments and therefore no encouragement to produce more. Thus, if the direct payment quota is set below what the farmers would produce anyway, the direct payments will have no impact on the level of production. Thus, in a sense, the minimum price, which induces the farmers to produce up to a certain level (q' in figure 6) nullifies the potentially distortionary impact of the direct payments, provided the direct payment quota is not set too high.
It should be mentioned that after having derived Results 2 and 3 we discovered that a similar result had been claimed by Alston and James in 2002. 36 
Policy implications
The analysis in section 3 shows that the dairy farming support system creates distortions that result in production inefficiency. Too much milk is produced. However, the different components of the support system; (i) tariffs, (ii) the minimum price, (iii) the direct payments and (iv) various other supports, are not equally detrimental in this respect. In particular, the system of direct payments does not add to the production inefficiency resulting from the minimum price, provided the total direct payment quota is not set too high. Interestingly, in the past, the direct payment quota has not been set too high. Every year since the late 1990s, the actual production of milk has been above and usually substantially above the direct payment quota. Thus, as it has been implemented, the system of direct payments has essentially been pure transfers from the state to dairy farmers with little or no distortionary impact.
There is another important advantage with the system of direct payments compared to many other types of supports. The rights embodied in the individual direct payments quotas and their transferability creates an additional, and possibly quite powerful, incentive for less efficient operators to sell and more efficient operators to purchase the rights and thus speed up the evolution toward increased efficiency in the dairy production industry.
This suggests that from the perspective of efficiency, the barriers to direct payment quota trading that have been erected within the current direct payments system should be removed. Most importantly; (i) quota trades should be allowed at any time, (ii) trades of temporary quotas as well as permanent quota transfers should be allowed and (iii) quotas should be perfectly divisible so that any part of the quota may be transferred.
Since they are clearly distortionary, the other components of the dairy support system, i.e. the minimum price and the various other supports should be reduced in favour of the direct payments system. What this means is that the financial support to dairy farmers contained in these other supports should be transferred to the system of direct payments. In that case, the authorities managing the support system have to be careful not to set the direct payment quota too high. In particular, they should be aware that as the minimum price is reduced, the direct payment quota may have to be reduced accordingly.
As a part of the official review of the dairy support system, it has been suggested that the direct payment system in its current form is somehow detrimental and should be modified. One proposal was to retain direct payments but abolish the direct payments quota, thus spreading the direct payments equally over all the entire milk production.
The findings of this paper show that this would be extremely ill-advised. Instead of the direct payments system having no impact on the level of production, this would lead to increased production and, therefore, added economic inefficiency of milk production. The result is in effect an example of the problem of the commons; a race for subsidies.
That this is the case can be easily verified with the help of figure 6 . If the direct payment quota is abolished, the demand price facing farmers would be pmin+S/q illustrated by the dashed curve in figure 6 . Obviously, with this demand, price farmers would choose to produce at q'' in figure 6. This is higher than what they would otherwise select, which is q'. Thus, excess production is increased with additional social loss as illustrated in figure 5 . Perhaps more strikingly, the production at q'' is really a production at Qupper in figure 7, which maximizes the economic inefficiency that can be generated with the direct payments system for any given payment, S.
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Discussion
The system of direct payments provides monetary support to dairy farmers. Moreover this support is directly related to their level of production up to a certain upper bound. Thus, it is clearly a production subsidy. A standard result in economic theory is that production subsidies generally lead to increased production. However, according to the analysis of this paer, this is not the case for the system of direct payments over a wide range of direct payment quotas.
What is happening here is that the dairy support system contains two distortionary incentives; the minimum price and the direct payments. Both encourage production. However, they interact in an interesting way. First the minimum price encourages production to a level above the socially optimal one. Second the direct payments encourage production but only up to the level of the direct payment quota. Beyond the direct payment quota, there are no direct payments and therefore no encouragement to produce more. Thus, if the direct payment quota is set below what the farmers would choose to produce anyway, the direct payments will have no impact on the level of production. Thus, in a sense, the minimum price, which induces the farmers to produce up to a certain level nullifies the potentially distortionary impact of the direct payments, provided the direct payment quota is not set above that level.
This may be taken to suggest that if the minimum price were abolished but the system of direct payments retained, the latter would lead to excessive production compared to the what is socially optimal. This interpretation, however, would be too simplistic.
The system of direct payments only distorts production if the direct payment quota is set above the level that farmers would choose without it. If the direct payment quota is set below that level, the system of direct payments will not distort production. Thus, with no minimum price, a system of direct payments will not generate excess production if the total payment quota, Q, is not set above the socially optimal production level (q* in figure 6 and figure 4 ).
